Insolvency Law Reform Bill: Voluntary administration - how it works in practice

Author: 
Ben Russell, Associate, Kensington Swan

Insolvency Law Reform Bill

Voluntary administration - how it works in practice.

1 The Insolvency Law Reform Bill was tabled before Parliament on 21 December 2005. The Select Committee have reported on the Bill and current indications are that it will become law, in substantially its current form, in early 2007. The bill will introduce the Australian-based Voluntary Administration regime.

2 Insolvency practitioners will need to understand how this new procedure works, and what immediate practical issues arise on appointment. This paper will explain the key features of this procedure, and discuss:
• important timeframes;
• what effect the appointment has on creditors;
• potential pitfalls for administrators;
• the second meeting;
• examples where Deeds of Company Arrangement (“DOCA”) have been successful; and
• what happens when a DOCA terminates.

3 Objective

3.1 The stated objective of Voluntary Administration (under the proposed part 15A of the Companies Act) is to provide for the affairs of an insolvent company, or one that may become insolvent, to be administered in a way that:
a. Maximises the chances of the company, or as much as possible of its business, continuing in existence; or
b. If it is not possible for the company to continue in existence, results in a better return for the company’s creditors than would result from an immediate liquidation.

4 Commencement of VA
4.1 Voluntary administration commences when an administrator is appointed. The appointment of an administrator may be initiated by the company if its directors resolve that the company is insolvent, or likely to become insolvent. The appointment needs to be in writing.

4.2 Voluntary administration may also be instigated by a secured creditor who has an enforceable security interest on the whole or substantially the whole of the company’s properties. If a company is in liquidation, or interim liquidation, the liquidator may also initiate an administration.

5 First Meeting

5.1 Within five working days after the administration begins, the voluntary administrator must issue notices to “as many creditors as reasonably practicable” convening a meeting which is to be held within eight working days. Notice calling the meeting is to be sent 5 working days before the meeting. The meeting must also be advertised.

5.2 At this meeting creditors have the opportunity to replace the administrator and to appoint a committee of creditors. The provisions of schedule 5 of the Companies Act apply as if the administrator was a liquidator, therefore the conduct of the meeting is essentially the same as for a meeting of creditors in a liquidation. The key difference is that in order for a resolution to be passed, a majority in number and a 75% majority in value of the creditors must vote in favour of the resolution.

Ansett administration
5.3 Before the first meeting of the Ansett administration, to be held 5 days after appointment, representative employees obtained an order permitting union representatives to vote on behalf of employees that were union members but not represented by proxy or in person. There were many employees (16,000) widely dispersed. From that moment, the union representing a majority of creditors in number and in value ($686 million, principally contingent redundancy claims) controlled the voting and significantly influenced the administration.

6 Effect of Appointment
6.1 The administrator assumes control of the company, and its property and affairs. To give the company breathing space, a moratorium comes into effect. There are also personal liability issues which administrators need to be aware of.

Moratorium
6.2 A moratorium (with certain exceptions) is imposed upon creditors of the company, on those who own property used by the company, and on any party who holds a guarantee from a director of the company. The moratorium is intended to preserve the company’s position until the watershed meeting, which is to be held with 25 days of appointment.

6.3 This prevents creditors from taking action against the company without the administrator’s written consent or leave of the court. Owners of leased goods therefore cannot take action to recover goods during the administration period without consent. The administrator cannot sell the property except:
a. with the consent of the owner; or
b. in the ordinary course of business; or
c. with the leave of the court.

Ansett – extended moratorium
6.4 In the Ansett administration, the period between the first and second meetings was extended for a total of just over six months. At the reconvened second meeting the creditors passed a resolution that the company execute a DOCA. The time within which the DOCA was to be executed was then extended by a further two months. This meant that secured creditors, such as lessors of aircraft, were bound by the moratorium which continued right throughout that eight month period.

Exceptions to the moratorium

6.5 The main exception to the moratorium is that it is not binding on substantial secured creditors i.e., charge holders with a charge over the whole, or substantially the whole, of the assets of the company. This allows substantial secured creditors to appoint a receiver. This option must be exercised within 10 working days of receiving notice of the appointment of the administrator.

6.6 Other people not bound by the moratorium include:
a. a secured creditor who holds a charge other than a charge over the whole, or substantially the whole, of the property of the company, and has begun to enforce the charge prior to commencement of the administration;
b. a secured creditor who holds a charge over perishable property, irrespective of whether the charge is enforced before or after the appointment;
c. owners or lessors of property used or in the possession of the company who have enforced a right to take possession prior to appointment; and
d. owners or lessors of perishable property.

6.7 Secured creditors and owners or lessors of property (as described in a and c above) must have actually commenced enforcement of the charge or recovery of property to fall within the exception. Mere service of a demand for repayment will not suffice.

Court orders restricting rights of secured creditors and owners of property
6.8 The court can make orders restricting the enforcement rights of the people in a to d above. It may only do so if what the administrator proposes to do will adequately protect that person’s interest. This can be a useful power to an administrator wishing to keep the assets of the business together for sale as a going concern.

6.9 Debis Financial Services (Aust) Pty Ltd v Allied Bellambi Collieries Pty Ltd (1999) 17 ACLC 1636 is an example of the use of this power. Debis had a charge over a large item of mining equipment, located underground in a mine. Prior to the administrator’s appointment, a receiver had been appointed to that piece of equipment by Debis. The administrator put forward a DOCA proposal under which the mine would be sold to a purchaser, that would also purchase the mining equipment, and pay out the secured creditor. The administrator filed proceedings and sought an order preventing the receiver from gaining access to the machine during the administration. The receiver opposed on the basis that if the sale went ahead but did not include the equipment, then it would have difficulty recovering it because the mine would need to be shut down for it to be retrieved. The administrator gave an undertaking that any sale agreement would contain a clause that allowed Debis to remove the machine on reasonable notice if it was not included in the sale agreement. This was held to be “adequate protection”. Hamilton J said that “the protection to which the Court is required to be satisfied is not protection which is absolute or perfect in all circumstances, but protection which is adequate or suitable considering the circumstances which actually prevail.”

6.10 Other factors the court will consider are the length of the remaining duration of the administration, the adequacy of the protection to the secured creditor, the fact that the value of the equipment on the open market was lower than its value as part of a going concern, and the general policy of the Act to permit companies to return to viability.

7 Personal Liability of Administrator

7.1 The Administrator is personally liable for general debts incurred during the administration period, but is entitled to an indemnity out of company assets. There is no personal liability for debts that fall due during the administration period under agreements entered into by the company pre-administration. Liability for unliquidated damages incurred during the administration period (e.g. liability for failure to comply with a covenant in a lease) will not be a debt for this purpose.

Employees
7.2 The Administrator is also liable for wages that accrue during the administration of the company, unless the administrator has lawfully given notice of the termination of the employment contract within 14 days of appointment. The court may, on the administrator’s application, extend the period of 14 days.

Rent and other payments
7.3 The Administrator is personally liable for rent and other payments accruing by the company during the administration period under rental agreements made before the administration began.

7.4 However there is a seven day “no liability period” following from the day that the administration begins. The Administrator may issue a non-use notice in relation to leases or rented property within seven days after the administration begins. The owner of the property may then exercise its rights in relation to the property. Non-use notices must specify the property to which it relates, and state that the company does not propose to use the property.

7.5 There is power for the court to excuse an administrator from liability, even though a non-use notice was not issued. This might be exercised where the books of the company are so disorganised that it was impossible to ascertain within 7 days what third party assets the company possessed.

7.6 If, on appointment, the company has limited assets, the administrator will usually have no option other than to cease trading the business in the absence of any external funding. Otherwise the administrator risks personal liability in relation to wages, rent and other payments.

8 Event of Default Clauses
8.1 There is no statutory right for a voluntary administrator to void clauses in company contracts that entitle the other party to terminate the contract by the mere fact of an appointment of a voluntary administrator, regardless of whether or not the company is able to perform. The moratorium does not extend that far.

8.2 In the One.Tel voluntary administration, the company’s supplier Optus immediately ceased to allow One.Tel to its network to continue to resell mobile telephony. As reselling access to a mobile phone network was One.Tel’s core business, any chance of a business restructure using a DOCA was shattered, and the company went into liquidation at the second meeting. In that case there was probably little that could have been done, however the message is for administrators to immediately talk to suppliers if they wish supply to continue.

9 Second or “Watershed” Meeting
9.1 Within 25 working days of appointment, the voluntary administrator must hold a second meeting at which the creditors of the company will decide the company’s fate, unless the convening period for the second meeting is extended by the court. This meeting is referred to as the “watershed” meeting.

9.2 The notice for the meeting must be sent out 5 days before the meeting and must contain:
a. a report as to the affairs of the company,
b. a copy of any proposal for a deed of company arrangement, and
c. a statement of the administrator’s opinion on the three possible alternatives for the company:
i. returning the company to its directors;
ii. appointing a liquidator; or
iii. executing a rescue or compromise proposal in the form of a DOCA.
The second meeting can be adjourned for up to sixty days (unless a further extension is ordered by the court).

9.3 As discussed above, the provisions of schedule 5 of the Companies Act apply as if the administrator was a liquidator, therefore the conduct of the second meeting is essentially the same as for a meeting of creditors in a liquidation. The key difference is that in order for a resolution to be passed, a majority in number and a 75% majority in value of the creditors must vote in favour of the resolution.

Extension of time for second meeting
9.4 The administrator may also apply to the court to extend the convening period between the first and second meetings. Reasons to make such an application for an extension may include:
a. to enable the administrator to finish the report;
b. to enable preparation of a DOCA;
c. to continue negotiations regarding a sale of the business; and
d. to discuss the draft with the creditor’s committee, so as to increase the chances of acceptance.
This is a power that has been used frequently in Australia. The judgment of Young J in Mann v Abruzzi Sports Club (1994) 12 ACLC 137 gives an insight into the court’s approach:
“The administrator is, on the evidence, doing the best he can to deal speedily with negotiations to enable the company to go back into survival mode and it would seem that there is no prejudice to creditors or to members in extending the time. Furthermore, if a meeting of creditors was convened now the administrator would not have sufficient material to be able to give a meaningful account of his administration to the creditors.

Accordingly it seems to me that this is a case where I should extend the time. I am a little reluctant to do so because I do not wish to invite a spate of these applications whenever administrators find that they run out of time to comply with the Act. On the other hand I do not want it thought that administrators can only apply where they have special grounds. In all cases one must keep in mind the object of the [Act]”

9.5 It seems that the bill will allow an application for an extension after the end of the convening period. However, a prudent administrator should apply before the end of the convening period, if at all possible. The court will want to see evidence in relation to:
a. the wishes of the secured creditors and owners and lessors of property, because they are primarily the parties affected by the extension of the moratorium;
b. the work done to date by the administrator.

9.6 Applications for extensions of time, and in fact all applications for orders under this new part of the Companies Act, should be brought promptly and on affidavit evidence, in a similar manner to which a receiver’s application for directions is currently sought. Alternatively, the application may be brought as an interlocutory application using the same procedure as when seeking an injunction.

10 Why would a substantial secured creditor support administration?
10.1 The question is often asked as to why a substantial secured creditor would support an administration and not appoint a receiver within the 10 day period. There are a number of circumstances when a secured creditor might prefer to support administration:
a. When there is doubt as to whether enforcement would realise a sufficient amount to repay the secured debt. Putting together a DOCA with the co-operation of directors and other creditors may result in a better outcome.
b. Although a receiver appointed by a secured creditor with a charge over the whole, or substantially the whole, of the company’s assets will usually be entitled to run the business and sell it as a going concern, the receiver will have to deal with claims by lessors of equipment, suppliers collecting stock under reservation of title, and landlords threatening to repossess premises. Under voluntary administration, the moratorium (subject to the above mentioned exceptions) will mean those persons will not be able to frustrate the administrator’s ability to operate the business and hold it together while a DOCA is formulated.
c. Transactions between the company and a secured creditor may be subject to the voidable transactions provisions of the Companies Act. Administrators do not have the ability to challenge voidable transactions, only liquidators. In that case, the secured creditor may prefer to keep the company out of liquidation.
d. If the secured creditor is comfortable with the capability and integrity of the administrator, it may be happy to let the administration proceed.

10.2 It is important to remember that a secured creditor is only bound by a DOCA to the extent that its terms restrict enforcement of security rights, or if it votes in favour of it. A DOCA must therefore always cater specifically for, and appeal to, secured creditors. Therefore it is open to secured creditors to support an administration and wait to see if there is a satisfactory deed proposal at the second meeting. If none emerges, the company will go into liquidation and the secured creditor can enforce at that point. Alternatively, if the DOCA proposal does not appeal, a substantial secured creditor can elect not to vote for it, and enforce at that point.

11 Use of casting vote

11.1 The administrator must chair the meeting and has a casting vote. This means that when there is a majority in number going one way on a resolution to approve a DOCA, and a 75% majority in value going against the DOCA, the administrator can decide.

11.2 There have been a number of Australian cases regarding use of the casting vote, where a DOCA has been terminated by order of the court due to inappropriate use of the casting vote. What is required of administrators is a weighing up of a number of factors. Administrators should consider:
a. opposition to the proposal by the major creditor, especially when there is a large disproportion between the major debt and the other debts;
b. support from directors where the DOCA will give advantage to them;
c. the overall objectives of the voluntary administration regime.

12 Deeds of Company Arrangement
12.1 DOCA’s are essentially the compromise or restructure between the company and its creditors. They can vary from a mere moratorium to a major reorganisation or compromise. The major disadvantage with deeds of company arrangements is that in practice they do not work unless they separately bind, or specially cater for creditors who are not merely unsecured. Priority creditors need to be looked after otherwise they will not vote in favour of the proposal.

12.2 A DOCA proposal may be internal or external. An example of an internal proposal may effectively be a compromise proposal from shareholders, directors or management. An external proposal may come from an outside party wishing to purchase the company’s business, and continue to carry on business under the existing corporate structure.

12.3 Whatever the proposal, it must generally offer a better return to unsecured creditors than what they would be likely to receive in a liquidation. It must also appeal to secured creditors otherwise at the end of the administration period, those creditors will not vote in favour of the DOCA and be able to enforce.

12.4 There are a series of prescribed provisions which will apply in a DOCA unless expressly excluded. These terms include:
a. the identity of the deed administrator;
b. the property available to creditors (sometimes referred to as the Deed Fund);
c. to what extent the company will be released from its debts (i.e. the extent to which available funds will be distributed to each class of creditors);
d. the conditions, if any, for the deed to come into operation;
e. order of priority; and
f. circumstances in which the deed terminates.

The aim of the process is to allow the terms to be flexible.

Execution of DOCA
12.5 If a proposed DOCA approved by creditors is not executed within the 15 day working period following the meeting without an extension, the administrator must apply to the court for appointment of a liquidator. A DOCA is usually executed by the company and its administrators.

Unequal treatment of creditors
12.6 There is no obligation under a DOCA to treat classes of creditors equally if there are general commercial reasons for not doing so. Australian courts have said that a DOCA which forces certain classes of unsecured creditors to wait longer than other classes, and to receive less, is not unfairly prejudicial. In many cases there will be commercial reasons for discriminating in favour of, for example, subcontractors if it is vitally necessary for the company to retain the loyalty of those people.

12.7 However, with the priority to the IRD for GST and PAYE in a liquidation scenario remaining in place, and the requirement for a resolution to be approved by a majority in number and 75% in value, it may be difficult to achieve a DOCA with unequal treatment of different classes of creditors. This is because creditors should always compare their treatment under the DOCA proposal with a liquidation.

Secured creditors not bound
12.8 A DOCA will bind all creditors of the company for claims arising on or before the day specified in the deed. Secured creditors that do not vote in favour of the DOCA are not bound. Entering into the DOCA creates a separate regime that governs the rights between the parties.

Termination of a DOCA
12.9 A DOCA can be terminated:
a. by court order;
b. by creditor’s resolution at a meeting convened by the deed administrator or requested by 10% or more of the creditors in value; or
c. automatically on an event specified in the DOCA.
When a DOCA is terminated, technically the company reverts to its directors and shareholders. However the court or creditors at a meeting terminating the DOCA can vote to appoint a liquidator.

12.10 A DOCA releases the company from debt only to the extent provided for in the DOCA and to the extent that the creditor concerned is bound by the DOCA. Debts incurred under the DOCA period are not personal debts of the deed administrator.

Suitable for large companies?

12.11 A DOCA can deal with companies of any size, however the size and complexity of a company will mean that the convening period will often have to be extended until such time as the administrator is able to made a recommendation in relation to the future of the company. This is what happened in Ansett, with a delay well beyond the 25 day moratorium period initially contemplated in the Act. For a large public listed company, it has been suggested that interim liquidation is more appropriate. This was the step taken by the directors of HIH Insurance Limited.

13 Deed of Company Arrangement – Case Studies

Pasminco - Zinifex
13.1 Pasminco Limited was a large ASX listed company which appointed a voluntary administrator in September 2001. Pasminco continued to trade and a restructure of the group was effected by a DOCA, achieved principally by splitting the group into two parts and exchanging existing debt for equity in the restructured entity, with the sale of 50% (approximately) of the equity in the market place.

13.2 The DOCA had sufficient flexibility to allow for the variations to the structure for the proposed capital raising if the float was not to proceed. Creditors accepted the DOCA and Pasminco, now renamed Zinifex, successfully refloated in April 2004. The share price has risen significantly since floating which indicates the market’s general acceptance of the restructure.

W C Penfold – Stationary Group - June 2004
13.3 The key feature of the DOCA was the sale of the company’s business to a consortium of investors including two directors, a corporate recovery fund, and an office products marketing group. It was effectively a management buy-out. Under the DOCA the buyer took possession of the brand, stock, fixtures and fittings, and store leases.

13.4 The unsecured creditors received a meagre 3.3c in the dollar of the $6.4 million in debt. However 21 of the 32 stores remained open, to come under a franchise arrangement. All current and past employees received their entitlements. The alternative was a liquidation and the business would not continue. A nil dividend was forecast. Creditors were critical that the same directors ended up in control with no exposure, however they had also lost their investment.

13.5 The returns to unsecured creditors were funded by the sale of the listed corporate shell. This occurred through use of a Creditor’s Trust Deed, which was contemplated in the DOCA. If the deed administrator deemed it appropriate, the DOCA allowed him to establish a creditor’s trust.

13.6 The unsecured creditors under the DOCA became beneficiaries of a trust, and the administrator becomes the trustee. This enables the DOCA to be terminated and a recapitalisation of the listed shell to occur. Creditor’s trusts are a useful tool where the company is listed, as there is generally always value in a listed shell.

14 Popularity of Voluntary Administration

14.1 Voluntary administration is the most popular form of insolvency administration in Australia. In June 2004, the Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services reported on the effectiveness of the VA regime after a decade of operation.

14.2 The submissions received commented positively on the procedure and the general view was that the process is a useful and valuable procedure. The committee concluded that the process strikes a balance because it allows time and breathing space for a business to reorganise, failing which the procedure permits a prompt transition to a liquidation. The procedure is flexible and it gives insolvency practitioners an effective tool to restructure businesses experiencing financial difficulty.

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